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ABSTRACT: The evidence from many experiments suggests that people are 
heterogeneous with regard to their abilities to make rational, forward looking, 
decisions. This raises the question when the rational types are decisive for 
aggregate outcomes and when the boundedly rational types shape aggregate 
results. We examine this question in the context of a long-standing and important 
economic problem – the adjustment of nominal prices after an anticipated money 
shock. Our experiments show that when agents’ actions are strategic substitutes 
adjustment to the new equilibrium is extremely quick whereas under strategic 
complementarity adjustment lasts very long and is associated with relatively large 
real effects. This adjustment difference occurs because price expectations are 
very flexible under substitutability and very sticky under complementarity. Our 
results suggest that strategic complementarity does not only provide incentives for 
the rational types to partly mimic the behavior of the boundedly rational types but 
it also renders people less rational and forward looking. In addition, under 
complementarity people attribute less rationality to the other players.  
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I. Introduction 
There is now a large body of evidence suggesting that, at the level of individual decision-
making, a substantial fraction of the people violate the rationality assumptions routinely made in 
most economic models (Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky 1982; Camerer 1995; Kahneman and 
Tversky 2000; Camerer, forthcoming). However, this evidence does not imply that individual 
deviations from rationality necessarily falsify the aggregate predictions of rational choice 
models. In competitive experimental markets, for instance, in which agents trade standardized, 
non-risky, goods, prices and quantities typically converge quickly and reliably to the competitive 
equilibrium derived from individual rationality assumptions (Smith 1962 and 1982). Gode and 
Sunder (1993) have shown that even programmed players with “zero intelligence” quickly 
converge to the competitive equilibrium. Thus, there are conditions in which deviations from 
individual rationality have little effect on aggregate outcomes.  
It would, however, be also a mistake to assume that the impact of bounded rationality is 
always removed by interactions in competitive markets. Theoretical work by Akerlof and Yellen 
(1985), Haltiwanger and Waldman (1985, 1989) and Russell and Thaler (1985) shows that there 
are plausible conditions under which even a small fraction of boundedly rational agents may 
have important effects on aggregate results. Moreover, empirical work by Camerer (1987) and 
Gneezy, Kapteyn and Potters (forthcoming) suggests that individual deviations from full 
rationality can have a significant impact on competitive market outcomes. In view of these 
results the key question, therefore, is to identify the conditions under which limited rationality 
matters and when it does not matter.  
In this paper we tackle this question experimentally in the context of an important 
economic problem – the sluggish adjustment of nominal prices after a fully anticipated and 
exogenous monetary shock. For decades, macroeconomists have been interested in the 
microfoundations of nominal price stickiness because it is widely believed that nominal inertia is 
a main reason for the short-run non-neutrality of money. Much of the literature has emphasized 
informational (Lucas 1972, Mankiw and Reis 2002), contractual (Fischer 1977, Taylor 1979) 
and other (Mankiw 1985, Ball and Romer 1991) frictions as causes of nominal inertia. There is, 
however, still considerable disagreement about the extent and the sources of nominal price 
inertia (see, e. g., Blinder, Canetti, Lebow and Ruud 1998; Romer 2001). Since we explicitly 
examine the determinants of nominal price stickiness, our experiments do not only illuminate 
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when limits to rationality matter but they also contribute to a deeper understanding of the 
sources of nominal inertia. We show, in particular, that – in the absence of any exogenous 
frictions or costs of price adjustment – the strategic environment is a decisive factor shaping the 
nature and the extent of nominal price stickiness.  
Our experimental design is inspired by the theoretical work of Haltiwanger and Waldman 
(henceforth HW, 1989). They show that a given fraction of agents with non-rational, adaptive, 
expectations have more or less influence on the speed of adjustment towards equilibrium 
depending on the extent to which agents’ actions are strategic complements. The model of HW 
suggests that when strategic substitutability prevails boundedly rational players have a smaller 
impact on the adjustment of prices after an anticipated money shock than when complementarity 
prevails.1 As a consequence, one would expect nominal inertia to be smaller under 
substitutability. However, to our knowledge there is no empirical work examining how strategic 
substitutes and complements differentially affect the nature and the speed of price adjustment 
after a shock.2 Therefore, we implemented a price setting experiment with a complements and a 
substitutes condition. In both conditions any exogenous frictions for nominal price adjustment 
were absent. This means that if all subjects have rational expectations about the other players’ 
actions and play a best reply to their expectation, the money shock leads to complete 
instantaneous adjustment in both the complements and the substitutes treatment. We know, 
however, from previous work (Fehr and Tyran 2001) that a fraction of the subjects exhibits 
money illusion in price setting games like ours because they take nominal payoffs as a proxy for 
real payoffs. Fehr and Tyran (2001) show, in particular, that the indirect effects of money 
illusion arising from the impact of money illusion on expectations are important. It is, therefore, 
of particular interest to examine how the strategic environment affects the subjects’ expectations 
about other subjects’ behavior. 
Our results show that the strategic environment plays indeed a decisive role. Under 
strategic substitutability adjustment towards equilibrium is extremely quick whereas under 
                                                           
1 Price competition in oligopolistic goods markets is often characterized by strategic complementarity because if 
other firms cut prices individual firms often have an incentive to also cut their price. Cournot duopoly is a good 
example of strategic substitutability. The more firm j produces the less will firm i produce. In a macroeconomic 
context strategic complementarity plays a role if search frictions (Diamond 1982), informational frictions 
(Bryant 1983) or increasing returns (Weitzman 1982) are important. For a general account of the role of 
strategic complementarity in macroeconomic models see Cooper (1999). 
2 There is an interesting literature (Nagel 1995; Ho, Camerer and Weigelt 1998) on the depth of reasoning in 
games. However, the focus of this literature is not on how strategic substitutes and complements differentially 
affect behavior but how many steps of iterated reasoning underlies subjects’ behavior in games that can be 
solved by iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. The literature also does not deal with how money 
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complementarity there is long-lasting nominal inertia that is associated with large real effects. In 
fact, in the substitutes treatment we cannot reject the hypothesis that nominal prices are 
instantaneously in equilibrium after the shock while in the complements treatment the 
hypothesis of equilibrium play can be rejected for 8 periods. These results provide support for 
the predictions of the HW-model. The proposition that the distinction between complements and 
substitutes has important effects on the adjustment dynamics of a heterogeneous population is 
well borne out by the data. 
However, our results also go in important ways beyond the factors identified by HW. 
According to the HW-approach a given distribution of players with adaptive and rational 
expectations causes different aggregate adjustment behavior depending on whether actions are 
strategic complements or substitutes. The key idea here is that, for given expectations, 
differences in the strategic environment cause different behaviors. Under complementarity the 
rational types have an incentive to partly mimic the adaptive types whereas under substitutability 
the rational types compensate the behavior of the adaptive types. If that were indeed the only 
source of behavioral differences across treatments it should be possible to explain the 
adjustment differences by assuming that the fraction of adaptive players is constant across 
treatments. Yet, this is not the case. 
If we simulate the post-shock adjustment dynamics with varying assumptions about the 
fraction of adaptive players, the best fit with the actual average price under strategic substitutes 
is achieved if we assume that only 25 percent of the players have adaptive expectations. In the 
complements treatment, however, we need a much larger percentage of adaptive players to 
reproduce the actual adjustment path. This suggests that strategic substitutability renders the 
players more rational and more forward looking. This view is also supported by the fact that in 
the substitutes treatment much more subjects choose the exact equilibrium price already in the 
first post-shock period. Moreover, immediately after the shock, the players in the substitutes 
treatment expect most other players to choose prices that are exactly at, or close to, the post-
shock equilibrium. In contrast, in the complements treatment the majority of the subjects expects 
prices that are close to the pre-shock level. We conclude that the strategic environment not only 
translates given non-rational expectations into different extents of nominal inertia, but the 
strategic environment also importantly affects expectations formation. In particular, we find that 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
shocks affect nominal inertia.  
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under complementarity expectations are very sticky while under substitutability they are very 
flexible. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we discuss our 
experimental design. In Section III we present our results and section IV summarizes and 
concludes the paper.  
 
II. Experimental Design 
This section provides a general description of the experimental design and explains experimental 
procedures and parameters. 
 
A. General Description of the Experimental Design 
To study how the strategic environment affects aggregate outcomes we designed a complements 
treatment (CT) and a substitutes treatment (ST). Both treatments were embedded in an n-player 
price setting game with a unique equilibrium. The game was divided in a pre- and a post-shock 
phase and at the beginning of the post-shock phase we implemented an exogenous and fully 
anticipated nominal shock. By comparing price adjustment after the shock across the CT and the 
ST we can study the impact of the strategic environment on adjustment dynamics.  
At the beginning of this project we designed a price setting game with monopolistic 
competition. It turned out, however, that – for our purposes – this design has two major 
drawbacks. First, and most importantly, within the context of monopolistic competition it is not 
possible to move from strategic complementarity to strategic substitutability while keeping 
everything else constant. If one changes the slope of the reaction functions one changes in 
general also equilibrium prices, the real payoffs at equilibrium, the number of dominated 
strategies and the real payoffs in the neighborhood of best replies. Thus, in the context of 
monopolistic competition it is not possible to conduct a clean comparison between the impact of 
strategic complements and strategic substitutes. Second, the equilibrium under monopolistic 
competition is not efficient and this hinders the adjustment towards equilibrium. The existence 
of an inefficient equilibrium means that subjects can earn more money if they try to collude to 
prevent adjustment towards equilibrium. These efforts to collude introduce themselves some 
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nominal inertia, which is then confounded with the amount of nominal inertia that stems from 
strategic complementarity or substitutability.3  
We solved these problems with the following experimental design. First, we implemented 
a money neutral and efficient Nash equilibrium in both treatments. This rules out that collusion 
slows down adjustment towards equilibrium. Since the equilibrium is neutral with regard to the 
nominal shock variable (money supply) any real effects of the nominal shock must be associated 
with out-of-equilibrium behavior. Second, equilibrium prices and real equilibrium payoffs do 
not change across the CT and the ST. Third, real payoffs along the reaction functions are also the 
same across CT and ST. Fourth, within the range of feasible price choices, the number of strictly 
dominated strategies is identical across CT and ST. Finally, if a player deviated from best reply 
behavior the real income loss for a given deviation from the best reply is also identical across 
treatments. Thus, the players faced exactly the same incentives to play best replies in both 
treatments. Taken together this means that the only difference between the treatments concerned 
the slope of the reaction function. If, at a given price vector in the CT, the slope was z > 0, then 
the slope in the ST was given by -z < 0 at that price vector.  
In each experimental session we formed several groups of n players who played the pricing 
game for T = 30 periods. The group composition remained unchanged throughout the session. 
During the first T/2 periods of a session the money supply was given by M0. Then we 
implemented a fully anticipated monetary shock by reducing the money supply to M1 (see Table 
1 for a complete list of parameters). This shock and the fact that the post-shock phase lasted 
again 15 periods was common knowledge. We were mainly interested in comparing subjects’ 
pricing behavior across treatments in the post-shock phase. The pre-shock phase served the 
purpose of making subjects acquainted with the computer terminal and the decision 
environment. In addition, the pre-shock phase allowed subjects to reach an equilibrium in that 
phase. This is important as we wanted to study how the strategic environment affects adjustment 
                                                           
3 This question can also be viewed as a problem of unobservable strategic complementarity. It is well known that 
in the presence of cooperation opportunities many subjects exhibit preferences for conditional cooperation (see, 
e. g. Fehr and Fischbacher 2002). They are willing to cooperate if others cooperate as well. Since we cannot 
directly observe subjects’ preferences this introduces unobservable strategic complementarity, i.e. we lose 
control over the precise amount of complementarity. We conducted pilot experiments with monopolistic 
competition, which confirmed these problems. After the nominal shock, subjects tried hard to reap the gains 
from collusion, which strongly retarded adjustment towards equilibrium. Note that this means that strategic 
complementarity is not necessarily a feature of the objectively given technology of interaction. Subjective 
preferences may also be an important source of strategic complementarity that adds to nominal inertia. Yet, since 
we wanted to have full control over the extent of strategic complementarity we ruled out that preferences for 
conditional cooperation can play a role in our experiments.  
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to a purely nominal shock after subjects had already reached the money neutral equilibrium. This 
ensures that the adjustment requirements are the same across treatments.  
The real payoff of subject i was given by 
(1) vi = vi(Pi, iP− , M),  
where Pi denotes i’s nominal price, iP−  represents the average price of the other n-1 group 
members while M denotes a common nominal shift variable (money supply).  
The real payoff function vi(.) is homogenous of degree zero in Pi , iP− , and M. Since we 
implemented a unique equilibrium homogeneity of degree zero ensured that the equilibrium was 
neutral in money.4 Note also that, for a given money supply, the optimal choice of Pi depends 
only on the average price of the other players and not on the other players’ individual prices. 
This means that subjects need not form expectations about other players’ individual prices but 
only about the average price iP− . In addition, this payoff function has the advantage that, for a 
given money supply, we can represent the subjects’ payoffs in a matrix that informs subjects 
about their payoff at any feasible ( ii PP −, )-combination.  
 
B. Experimental Procedures and Parameters 
All major experimental parameters and design features are summarized in Appendix A and 
Table 1. The experimental instructions for the subjects are presented in Appendix B. The 
experiment was conducted in a computerized laboratory with groups of size n = 4.5 In each 
group there were two types of subjects: Subjects of type x and subjects of type y. The two types 
have slightly different payoff functions. The difference implies that the best reply of the x-types 
involved slightly lower prices than the best reply of the y-types. Since heterogeneity is a fact of 
life, the case of four different payoff functions would be the most realistic but also the most 
complicated one. Therefore we chose an intermediate solution with only two types of players. In 
total 76 subjects participated in our experiment. Each subject participated either in the CT or in 
the ST. In the pre-shock phase of each treatment the money supply was given by M0 = 42 while 
                                                           
4 To see that homogeneity of degree zero implies neutrality note that a change in M from M0 to λM0 = M1 leaves 
real payoffs unaffected if prices change to λPi and λ iP− . Moreover, if Pi, i = 1, 2, ..., n, is a best reply to iP−  at 
M0, λPi also is a best reply to λ iP−  at λM0. Thus, if iP * for all i is a pre-shock equilibrium, then λ iP * for all i is 
the post-shock equilibrium. 
5 We used the experimental software Z-Tree developed by Fischbacher (1999).  
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in the post shock phase it was given by M1 = M0/2 = 21. In the pre-shock equilibrium the average 
price over all n group members was given by 0*P = 25, while the post-shock equilibrium price 
was 1*P  = 12.5.  
* Insert Table 1 about here *  
The subjects had to choose a nominal price Pi ∈{1,2,3,…,30} in each decision period. In 
addition, they had to provide an expectation about P i−  which we denote by P i
e
− . At the end of 
each period each subject was informed about the actual realization of P i−  and the actual real 
payoff vi  on a so-called outcome-screen (see Appendix B). In addition, the outcome screen 
provided information about the subject’s past choices of Pi , past realizations of P i−  and past 
real payoffs vi . 
Subjects received the payoff information in the form of a matrix. In Appendix C and D we 
provide the post-shock payoff matrices for the x- and y-types for both treatment conditions. 
Appendix C shows the real payoffs for any feasible ( iP , iP− )-combination whereas Appendix D 
shows the nominal payoffs. We know from previous work (Fehr and Tyran 2001) that a fraction 
of the subjects exhibits money illusion if they face nominal payoff tables in a pricing game like 
ours because they use nominal payoffs as a proxy for real payoffs. Therefore, we gave the 
subjects only the nominal payoff tables. This is crucial for our purposes because we were 
interested in how the strategic environment affects behavior when some subjects are not fully 
rational. In the nominal payoff tables the matrix showed the nominal payoff Vi = iP− vi for each 
feasible ( iP , iP− )-combination. To compute the real payoff for a particular ( P Pi i, − ) combination 
a subject had to divide Vi = iP− vi by iP− . This was described at some length in the instructions 
(see Appendix B). The real payoff tables in Appendix C of our paper only serve the purpose of 
making it immediately transparent for the reader that, except for the slope of the best reply 
functions, the real payoff structure was kept constant across treatments. To render the difference 
across treatments transparent we have also shaded the best reply functions in Appendix C. 
Subjects did, of course, not receive nominal payoff tables with shaded best replies. To inform 
subjects about the payoffs of the other type, each subject also received the payoff matrix of the 
other type. This information was common knowledge. 
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At the end of period 15 the nominal shock was implemented in the following way: 
Subjects were publicly informed that x- and y-types receive new payoff tables. These tables were 
based on M1 = M0/2. Again, each subject received his or her own payoff table and the table of 
the other type. Subjects were told that, except for payoff tables everything else including group 
composition remained unchanged. They were given enough time to study the new payoff tables 
and to choose Pi  for period 16.
6 This procedure ensures that in period 16 subjects face an 
exogenous, fully anticipated and negative nominal shock: It is exogenous because subjects’ 
behavior does not affect the timing or the content of the new payoff tables. It is fully anticipated 
because the new tables were distributed before subjects had to decide and because the 
distribution of new tables was common knowledge. At the beginning of period 16 it was 
common knowledge that the experiment will last for further 15 periods. 
Note that there are no exogenous frictions present in this design: There are no nominal 
frictions, since nominal prices can be changed from period to period at no cost. There are no 
informational frictions, since subjects are given all information about the shock. 
 
III. Results 
In total we had 10 groups in the CT and 9 groups in the ST. The experiments took place at the 
University of Zürich and subjects were undergraduate students from different disciplines. They 
were paid a show up fee of roughly $7 (CHF 10) and their earnings from the experiment were on 
average $24 (CHF 34). An experimental session lasted, on average, 80 minutes. 
 
A. Adjustment of Prices 
To what extent do different strategic environments affect the adjustment of prices towards the 
post-shock equilibrium? A first impression is provided by Figure 1, which plots the evolution of 
pre- and post-shock average prices across treatments. The figure indicates that in the pre-shock 
phase nominal prices are quickly close to the average equilibrium price, which is given by 0*P = 
                                                           
6 Subjects were given ten minutes in total from distributing the new tables until they had to decide. During the first 
7 minutes, subjects could not enter any decision into the computer. Within the remaining 3 minutes, the average 
subject decided after 38 seconds in the CT and 39 seconds in the ST. Only very few subjects used up the 
available time entirely (two subjects in the CT and none in the ST took their decision less than 10 seconds before 
the available time had elapsed). Thus, if we observe disequilibrium play this cannot be due to time constraints.  
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25.7 Except for period 1 and 2 the hypothesis that pre-shock prices in the ST and the CT are in 
equilibrium can never be rejected. The situation changes, however, dramatically after the 
nominal shock. In the first post-shock period average prices in the CT are far above the 
equilibrium whereas in the ST prices even overshoot somewhat relative to the equilibrium. 
Moreover, according to Figure 1, it takes a large number of periods until nominal prices in the 
CT have fully adjusted. Only in period 27, twelve periods after the shock, CT-prices seem to be 
fully back to equilibrium. This contrasts sharply with the price dynamics in the ST, where full 
adjustment already seems to be achieved in the second period after the shock.  
 
* Insert Figure 1 about here * 
 
To examine the deviations from equilibrium more rigorously we have conducted the 
following regression for the post-shock phase:  
(2)  )1(
15
1
14
1
*
1 d ttd ttPP tt
jt −∑+∑=−
==
βα  
where jtP denotes the average price of group j in period t, 1*P
−  represents the average equilibrium 
price after the shock, and dt = 1 if the price observation in period t comes from the CT.8 The 
coefficients αt measure the deviation from equilibrium in the CT whereas the coefficients βt 
measure the deviation in the ST. We have summarized the results of regression (2) in Table 2. 
The absolute size of the coefficients in Table 2 inform us about how much average group prices 
deviate from equilibrium. This indicates that in period 16 the average price in the CT is 6.6 
above equilibrium while in the ST it is 1.17 below equilibrium. In fact, as the significance tests 
indicated in Table 2 show, we can never reject the hypothesis that group average prices in the ST 
are in equilibrium. For the CT, however, the hypothesis of equilibrium play can be rejected for 
the first eight post-shock periods at the 1 percent level. Thus, Figure 1 and Table 2 leave little 
doubt that the strategic environment has decisive effects on adjustment dynamics.  
                                                           
7 The reason for the quick adjustment in the pre-shock phase is that both in the CT and the ST there is a large 
number of strictly dominated strategies. Note that this is an inevitable consequence of the higher money supply 
in the pre-shock phase. A change in the nominal price in the post-shock phase (i.e., at M0/2) by one unit has the 
same real effects as a change in the nominal price by two units in the pre-shock phase (i.e., at M0). Thus, if a 
nominal price is strictly dominated in the post-shock phase, there will, in general, be two nominal prices that are 
strictly dominated in the pre-shock phase.   
8 To prevent linear dependence among the regressors we included no dummy variable for period 15 of the CT.  
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* Insert Table 2 about here * 
 
So far we have only looked at average prices. However, equilibrium also requires that individual 
actions coincide with equilibrium prices. For this purpose we have constructed Table 3 and 
Figures 2a and 2b. The figures graph the distribution of prices in the first post-shock period 
across treatments for the x-types (Figure 2a) and the y-types (Figure 2b). Recall that the 
equilibrium price for x-types (y-types) in the post-shock phase is *iP = 11 (
*
iP = 14). In the ST a 
remarkably high percentage of the x-types (72 percent) jump directly to the new equilibrium and 
17 percent are just one unit above the equilibrium. In contrast, in the CT the majority of the x-
subjects (50 percent) choose a price far above the equilibrium (i.e., Pi = 21) and only 25 percent 
jump directly to the new equilibrium. For the y-types the picture is qualitatively similar: 61 
percent of the subjects in the ST jump directly to the new equilibrium and 28 percent are only 
one unit above or below the equilibrium, whereas in the CT only 20 percent of the y-types play 
the equilibrium and the rest chooses prices far above the equilibrium.  
Table 3 shows that these differences in individual play across treatments last for a long 
time. This can be illustrated by comparing period 18 in the ST with periods 28-30 in the CT. In t 
= 18 already 92 percent of the subjects in the ST choose exactly the equilibrium price. A similar 
incidence of exact equilibrium play only occurs in the final three periods of the CT. Taken 
together these results indicate that equilibrium adjustment is breathtakingly quick in the ST 
whereas it is extremely slow in the CT. This provides support for the view that bounded 
rationality has very different effects depending on the strategic environment in which subjects 
interact.  
 
* Insert Figures 2a and 2b about here * 
* Insert Table 3 about here * 
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B. Best Reply Behavior and Price Expectations 
One reason for the different adjustment patterns could be that there are differences in best reply 
behavior across treatments. Since we asked subjects for their expectations regarding the average 
price of the other players we are able to compute the best reply for each subject in each period 
and compare it with the actual price choice.9 We have done this for the different price intervals 
depicted in Figures 3a and 3b. These figures compare the average best reply, in each interval for 
which we observe price expectations, with the actually chosen average price in response to these 
expectations. The numbers above the bars indicate the relative frequency of price expectations in 
the different price intervals.  
 
* Insert Figures 3a and 3b about here * 
 
Figure 3a shows that in the CT the average best reply for each given expectations interval almost 
exactly coincides with the average price that was chosen in the respective interval. Thus, the 
slow adjustment in the CT cannot be attributed to deviations from best reply behavior. Likewise, 
in the ST the average best replies are very close to the actual average prices in the different 
intervals.10 From this we can conclude that the differences in adjustment dynamics across 
treatments cannot be due to differences in best reply behavior.  
If subjects play most of the time a best reply to the expected average price of others then 
the differences in actual price choices across treatments are likely to be generated by differences 
in expectations. To examine the role of price expectations we plotted the average expectations in 
both treatments in Figure 4. The figure indicates that the average expectations are in equilibrium 
in the ST and the CT before the shock. After the shock average expectations remain very sticky 
in the CT but jump almost completely to the new equilibrium expectations in the ST. From 
period 17 onwards, average expectations are in equilibrium in the ST whereas in the CT out-of-
equilibrium expectations prevail till period 27. To examine this issue more rigorously we have 
conducted regressions analogously to equation (2). The only difference is that instead of the 
                                                           
9 If a subject does not exactly know the true value of iP− the computation of the best reply requires that the whole 
subjective distribution over iP−  is taken into account. However, for simplicity, in the following we use the term 
“best reply” in the sense of a best reply to the expectation of iP− .   
10 The only exception is the interval between 4 and 6. Note, however, that only one percent of the price 
expectations are in this interval so that the deviation between actual price and best reply is probably due to the 
small number of observations. Note also that in both treatments more than 80 percent of the post-shock choices 
represent exact best replies and the rest of the choices is typically close to the exact best reply.  
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actual deviation of group prices from the equilibrium we take the deviation of the groups’ price 
expectations from the equilibrium expectation as the dependent variable. The results of this 
regression are displayed in Table 4. The table shows that in period 16 the average expectation in 
the CT is 8.0 units above the equilibrium while in the ST it is only 0.9 units above equilibrium. 
Moreover, in the CT we can reject the hypothesis that subjects have equilibrium expectations (at 
the five percent level) for eight periods and at the ten percent level (p = 0.056) for the ninth post-
shock period, too. In the ST the hypothesis that expectations are in equilibrium can never be 
rejected at the ten percent level.   
 
* Insert Figure 4 about here * 
* Insert Table 4 about here * 
 
These results suggest that the key mechanism that generates the different adjustment 
behaviors is the differential stickiness of price expectations. Whereas strategic substitutability 
causes very flexible expectations that instantaneously are close to the equilibrium, strategic 
complementarity is associated with very sticky expectations. The players then play best replies 
to their expectations so that the flexible expectations translate into flexible prices in the ST 
while sticky expectations translate into sticky prices in the CT.  
 
C. Real Effects during Adjustment towards Equilibrium 
One important question in macroeconomics is whether anticipated monetary shocks are 
associated with real effects. To the extent to which adjustment towards equilibrium is slow, 
anticipated money shocks will cause real effects. Therefore one can expect that the negative 
monetary shock causes larger reductions in the players’ joint payoffs under complementarity 
than under substitutability. To check this we have computed for every group j and every period t 
how much the real average payoff of the group, v j , falls short of the real average payoff in 
equilibrium v*. Based on this computation we measure the efficiency loss of group j in period t 
by ε jt jtv v v= −( ) /
* * , i.e., as a percentage of the equilibrium payoff. In Figure 5 we present the 
evolution of the average value of ε jt  across treatments during the post-shock phase.  
 
* Insert Figure 5 about here * 
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If one interprets this figure one has to remember that we deliberately implemented payoff 
functions that imply relatively large payoff reductions in case that a subject does not play a best 
reply to the actual average price of the other players. This means that subjects have strong 
incentives to predict the average price of the others correctly because otherwise they cannot play 
a best reply. It is an inevitable consequence of this payoff structure that large payoff reductions 
are associated with out-of-equilibrium play. When interpreting Figure 5 we do, therefore, not put 
too much emphasis on the absolute value of ε jt . What is more important is the difference in the 
average value of ε jt  across treatments.  
The figure reveals that throughout the whole post-shock phase the payoff losses due to 
non-equilibrium play are much larger in the CT than in the ST. Whereas in the ST sizeable 
payoff losses only occur in the first two post-shock periods, in the CT large losses occur until 
period 27. This indicates that the different adjustment dynamics associated with strategic 
complements and substitutes give rise to considerably larger real effects in the complements 
condition.   
 
D. How does the Strategic Environment affect Behavior? 
In our view the outstanding feature of the post-shock adjustment of prices and expectations is 
how quickly equilibrium is reached in the ST relative to the CT. According to the approach 
taken by HW (1989) these large adjustment differences can be explained by the interaction 
between a given distribution of rational and adaptive players and the strategic environment. 
What is important here is that, in this approach, the rational players are also assumed to correctly 
anticipate the fraction and the behavior of the adaptive players.  
To illustrate how a given mix of rational and adaptive players affects the adjustment 
towards equilibrium in different strategic environment we have constructed Figures 6a and 6b. 
Both figures show simulations of adjustment behavior under different assumptions about the 
fraction of fully adaptive and rational agents. In addition, both figures also depict the actual price 
adjustment in our treatments. In Figure 6a, for instance, the graph associated with (2x,2y) is 
based on the assumption that, in the ST, both x-types and both y-types in the group exhibit fully 
adaptive expectations. Adaptations are fully adaptive if a player believes that last period’s 
average price of the other players is also this period’s average price. The graph shows that in this 
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case we should observe a cyclical adjustment behavior with large amplitudes and full adjustment 
would only be reached in period 27. The graph associated with (2x,1y) assumes that both x-
players but only one of the y-players has fully adaptive expectations whereas the other y-player 
correctly anticipates the behavior of the three adaptive players. In this case adjustment is also 
cyclical but with much smaller amplitudes and full adjustment is already reached in period 18. If 
only one of the x-players has adaptive expectations, and the others in the group are rational, then 
equilibrium in the ST is reached already in period 17 (see 1x-graph in Figure 6a). Figure 6b is 
constructed analogously. A comparison of the two figures shows that if all players are fully 
adaptive, in both treatments complete adjustment is only achieved in period 27. However, 
whereas in the ST adjustment is cyclical, in the CT the players gradually converge to the 
equilibrium from above. The big differences in adjustment speed across treatments occur when 
there are some rational players in the population because they partly mimic the actions of the 
adaptive players in the CT whereas in the ST they counteract the actions of the adaptive players. 
For instance, if one of the x-types is a rational player (see the (2x,1y)-graphs), equilibrium in the 
ST is reached in period 18 whereas in the CT adjustment is completed only in period 26. Thus, if 
one or more (but not all) players are rational the strategic environment has a large impact on 
adjustment speed.11  
 
* Insert Figures 6a and 6b about here* 
 
Figures 6a and 6b provide, however, also a first indication that the impact of the strategic 
environment may go beyond the factors discussed by HW (1989). In the ST a very good fit with 
the actual average price path is achieved if one assumes that only one player is adaptive (see 1x-
graph in Figure 6a). In the CT this assumption implies that complete adjustment is already 
achieved in period 19 whereas in fact this occurs only in period 27. In the CT the best fit with 
the actual average price path is achieved if we take the actually observed prices of period 16 as 
our initial values and assume thereafter that all players in the group have fully adaptive 
                                                           
11 Our results regarding adjustment speed vary a bit depending on whether we assume that x- or y-players are 
rational. The quantitative differences are, however, very small. In Figure 6a, for instance, the graph for the case 
where only the x-player is fully adaptive is almost identical to the case where only the y-player is fully adaptive 
(this case is not shown in the graph).  
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expectations. This simulation is shown in the graph (2x,2y, t = 16 actual) of Figure 6b.12 Thus, it 
seems difficult to explain the actual average price path on the basis of the assumption that there 
is the same mix of rational and adaptive players across treatments. This suggests that the 
strategic environment does more than just translate a given mix of expectation formation rules 
into different aggregate behaviors. Perhaps it also changes the players’ expectation formation 
rules.  
To explore this issue further we examined the distribution of individual price expectations 
in the first post-shock period in more detail (see Figures 7a and 7b). We concentrate on the first 
post-shock period for two reasons. First, in both treatments subjects played (very close to) the 
equilibrium for the last 10 pre-shock periods. This means that fully adaptive expectations, which 
rely only on the previous period’s price, and more backward looking adaptive expectations, 
which take into account the prices of several past periods, lead virtually to the same expectation 
in the first post-shock period. Therefore, details in the nature of adaptive expectations do not 
matter for the expectations of the players in the first post-shock period. Second, in t = 16 the 
expectations of the adaptive players are not yet affected by the responses of the rational players 
to the shock. In t > 16 the adaptive players’ expectations are affected by how the strategic 
environment shaped the responses of the rational players in t = 16. Thus, the observations in t = 
16 are particularly useful for discussing whether the strategic environment directly changes 
expectation formation across treatments.  
One important feature of Figures 7a and 7b is that equilibrium expectations are much more 
prevalent in the ST. Recall that the equilibrium expectation is given by eiP−−  = 13 for the x-
players and by eiP−−  = 12 for the y-players. In the ST 44.5, percent of the players exhibit exact 
equilibrium expectations; in the CT only 20 percent of the subjects have equilibrium 
expectations. Moreover, in the ST, 78 percent of the x-players and 88 percent of the y-players 
have expectations that are within two price units of the equilibrium expectation whereas in the 
CT we have only 25 and 20 percent, respectively. This indicates that the players attribute more 
rationality to the other players in the ST.  
                                                           
12 All the other simulations in Figure 6b do not capture the features of the actual average price path. This is due to 
the fact that 23 percent of the players in the CT directly jump to the equilibrium in period 16. However, this 
jump was based on wrong expectations about the behavior of the other players so that thereafter the players’ 
expectations are very sticky. This explains why after t = 16 the best simulation is based on the assumption that 
all players have fully adaptive expectations.  
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* Insert Figures 7a and 7b about here* 
The view that the strategic environment does more than just translating given expectation 
formation rules into different behaviors is further supported if we look at the stickiness of the 
expectations across treatments. Recall from Table 1 that, independently of the treatment 
condition, an adaptive x-player (y-player) expects iP−  to be equal to 26 (24) in period 16. In the 
CT, 45 percent of the x-players and 60 percent of the y-players have price expectations that are 
within 2 units of adaptive expectations. In contrast, in the ST only 6 percent of the x-players and 
zero percent of the y-players have such sticky price expectations. Thus, in the first post-shock 
period the frequency of adaptive expectations is much larger in the CT.  
Our data also suggest that subjects’ price expectations in the ST are more rational than in 
the CT. In the first post-shock period only 7.5 percent of the subjects in the CT but 25 percent in 
the ST predict the average price of the other players correctly. 15 percent of the subjects in the 
CT deviate at most by one unit from the correct prediction whereas in the ST the corresponding 
percentage is 42 percent. Thus, in the ST subjects do in fact make more accurate predictions 
about the other players’ behavior.  
Taken together, the evidence thus suggests that the strategic environment exerts an impact 
on behavior that goes beyond the factors predicted by the model of Haltiwanger and Waldman. It 
seems that strategic complementarity induces the players to be more backward looking and less 
rational. In addition, under complementarity the players attribute less rationality to the other 
players. We would like to stress, however, that these results do not invalidate the important 
insights following from the HW-approach but they complement this approach by showing that 
the strategic environment has an even stronger impact than suggested by HW.  
Our results raise the question why people are less forward looking and rational in the CT. 
Our conjecture is that this might occur because in the ST the pre- and the post-shock best replies 
for agents with adaptive expectations are radically different whereas in the CT they are relatively 
close together. To see this in more detail recall that in the final pre-shock period the equilibrium 
price for agents of type x is Pi = 24 and the equilibrium expectation is given by 
e
iP −  = 26. 
Almost all x-players indeed chose the equilibrium price and had equilibrium expectations 
towards the end of the pre-shock phase. Suppose that an x-player has adaptive expectations and 
chooses a best reply to this expectation, that is, he expects the pre-shock equilibrium value of 
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iP−  = 26 in the first post-shock period and chooses Pi = 21 in the CT and Pi = 1 in the ST. This 
means that if the other players also exhibit adaptive expectations, and hence choose similar 
prices as our x-player, the expectation error in the ST is much larger than in the CT. Therefore, 
the expectation error that arises from adaptive expectations becomes much more transparent in 
the ST than in the CT which may induce the players in the ST to be more forward looking. In a 
sense the ST “tells” me that if the other players do the same as I do, my expectation is 
completely wrong whereas in the CT my expectation is still roughly in line with what will 
happen. If this argument is correct we should observe that the players in the ST are less likely to 
exhibit adaptive expectations, which is indeed the case. 
 
IV. Summary  
There is now a lot of evidence indicating that a fraction of the people is not fully rational but in 
strategic interactions aggregate outcomes are more than just the summation of individual 
behaviors. Therefore, it is, in principle, possible that a large fraction of boundedly rational 
agents nevertheless will end up in a situation that is predicted by rational choice models. Yet, it 
is also possible that a small fraction of boundedly rational agents has a large effect on the 
behavior of the rational agents so that aggregate behavior is driven away from the rational 
prediction. In view of this it is important to know when bounded rationality matters and when it 
does not affect aggregate outcomes. We examined this question in the context of an important 
economic problem – the adjustment of nominal prices after a fully anticipated negative money 
shock.  
In our experiments the adjustment of nominal prices is instantaneous, and real effects of 
the money shock are absent, if all players have rational expectations and play a best reply to their 
expectation. This holds regardless of whether subjects’ actions are strategic complements or 
strategic substitutes. In fact, however, the strategic environment has a decisive impact on the 
nature and the speed of the adjustment process. When strategic complementarity prevails 
adjustment to the new equilibrium is very slow and associated with large effects on subjects’ 
real income. Under strategic substitutability adjustment is extremely quick and subjects even 
overshoot slightly relative to the new equilibrium. The evidence indicates that differences in the 
stickiness of price expectations are the key for understanding these results. If actions are 
complements expectations are very sticky while if actions are substitutes expectations are very 
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flexible. Since the players choose almost always a best reply to their expectations the differences 
in the inertia of price expectations translates into differences in actual price adjustment.  
The data suggest that the complementarity condition does not only provide incentives for 
the rational types to (partly) mimic the behavior of the adaptive players but it renders the 
subjects less forward looking and rational. In addition, the data also indicate that subjects 
attribute less rationality to the other players. We conjecture that some of these effects are 
triggered by the fact that in the complementarity condition the irrationality of adaptive 
expectations is less transparent. It remains a task for future work to examine whether this 
conjecture is valid.  
In view of the relevance of strategic complementarity for nominal inertia it is important to 
know to what extent it prevails in the field. There is work by Oh and Waldman (1990) and by 
Cooper and Haltiwanger (1993, 1996) suggesting the empirical relevance of strategic 
complementarity. The evidence of Blinder, Canetti, Lebow and Rudd (1998) on coordination 
failure as a source of nominal inertia also supports the view that strategic complementarity is 
important in the field. If real economies are indeed characterized by strategic complementarity 
then two conclusions follow from our results. First, if one neglects the existence of boundedly 
rational agents there is a high risk of making wrong predictions even if one is only interested in 
aggregate predictions. Second, theoretical analysis should not be limited to the analysis of 
equilibrium behavior but disequilibrium processes should be more seriously taken into account.  
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Appendix A - Functional Specification of Payoffs 
 
The real payoff function for all i is:  
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where A = -1  if type x 
A =  3  if type y 
Δ = 1 for both types 
A = 23 if type x 
A = 25 if type y 
Δ = 1 for both types 
 
*
iP  is the equilibrium price for player i, 
*
iP−  is the average price of the other players in 
equilibrium. M is the nominal shift variable. For the numerical values of the parameters please 
refer to Table 1. 
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Appendix B Instructions 
 
The original instructions were in German. This appendix contains a translation of the 
instructions used in the complements treatment (CT) for agents of type y.  
General instructions for participants 
 
You are participating in a scientific experiment, which is funded by the Swiss National 
Science Foundation. The purpose of this experiment is to analyze decision making in 
experimental markets. If you read instructions carefully and take appropriate decisions, you may 
earn a considerable amount of money. At the end of the experiment all the money you earned 
will be immediately paid out in cash. 
 
Each participant is paid CHF 15.- for showing up. During the experiment your income will 
not be calculated in Swiss Francs but in points. The total amount of points you collected during 
the experiment will be converted into Swiss Francs, by applying the following exchange rate: 10 
Points = 15 centimes. 
 
Here is a brief description of the experiment. A more detailed description is given below. All 
participants are in the role of firms, selling some product. In this experiment, there are two types 
of firms: firms of type x and firms of type y. Each firm has to choose a selling price in every 
period. The income you earn depends on the price you choose and on the prices all other firms 
choose. 
 
During the experiment you are not allowed to communicate with any other participant. If 
you have any questions, the experimenters will be glad to answer them. If you do not follow 
these instructions you will be excluded from the experiment and deprived of all payments. 
The following pages describe the procedures of the experiment in detail. 
 
Detailed information for firms of type y 
 
This experiment lasts 15 periods plus one trial period. You are not paid for the trial period. 
You should nevertheless take the trial period seriously since you may gain experience in this 
period. This experience helps you to take decisions in the other periods which are paid. You are 
in the role of a firm, just as all other participants in this experiment. All participants are in 
groups of 4, i.e. every participant is in a group with three other firms. There are two firms of 
type x and two firms of type y in every group. 
You are a firm of type y 
Consequently, there are two other firms of type x and one more firm of type y in your group. 
No participant knows which persons are in his or her group. Yet, everybody knows that the 
group composition remains constant throughout the experiment. The decisions taken by other 
groups are irrelevant for your group. 
 
In every period all firms simultaneously decide which selling price they set for the current 
period. Every firm has to choose an integer price from the interval 1 ≤  selling price ≤  30. 
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How much you earn depends on the price you choose and on the average price of all other 
firms in your group. Independent of the type, the average price for every firm is calculated by the 
following formula: 
 
Average price = (Sum of selling prices of the other 3 firms) / 3 
 
Consequently, the average price will be in the interval 1 ≤  selling price ≤  30. 
The average price is rounded to the closest integer. 
 
 
How to read the income table for a firm of type y 
 
The green income table shows your nominal income in points if you choose a specific price 
and a specific average price results in this period (see separate table). Your income at the end of 
the experiment is not based on nominal income in points, but on real income in points. The 
following relation between the two holds: 
Real income = Nominal income / Average price of other firms 
This formula holds for all firms. The real point income that will be paid out is rounded in 
every period to the closest integer. 
 
Example: Suppose, you choose a price of 2 and the actual average price is 4. In this case your nominal point income 
is 13 points. Your (rounded) real income is 3 points (= 13 / 4). 
 
When you decide which price to choose, you do not yet know which average price will 
actually result in this period. The green income table can consequently help you to calculate your 
real point income given your expectation on the average price of other firms. 
 
Example: Given an expectation about the average price you can read off the green table the payoff you get when 
choosing different selling prices. For example, if you expect an average price of 27 and choose a price of 17, your 
expected nominal income is 55 points, your expected real income is 2 points (= 55/27). If you choose a price of 26 
at this expected price, your expected nominal income is 343 points and your expected real income is 13 points (= 
343/27). 
 
Please note that you are in a group with one firm of type y and two firms of type x. To deter-
mine the income of the other firm of type y, you have to use the green table. To determine the 
income of the other two firms of type x, you have to use the blue income table. This table also 
shows nominal income in points. The same formula above is used to calculate real payoffs for 
firms of type x. 
 
 
What the screens show  
 
On both screens described below the current period is indicated in the upper left corner, and 
the upper right corner displays remaining time in seconds to decide or to view the screen. 
 
The upper half of the input screen (see figure on next page) has three cells, where you can 
enter your decisions into the computer.  
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Price decision: Enter an integer number between 1 and 30 into the first cell. You can activate 
this cell (as well as the other cells) by clicking into the cell with your mouse. If you want to 
revise your decision, you can erase the number by hitting the backspace key. 
Expected average price: Enter an integer number between 1 and 30 into the second cell. This 
input does not affect your income and will not be known to other firms. Your payoff will be 
determined by the actual average price of this period. Please try to indicate an expectation that is 
as exact as possible since this is going to help you to take your own price decision. 
Confidence: Enter an integer number from 1 to 6 to indicate how confident you are that the 
average price you expect (= number in the second cell) will actually result. 
The numbers stand for: 
1 = I am not at all confident that my expectation will be correct 
2 = I am not very confident that my expectation will be correct 
3 = I am not quite confident that my expectation will be correct 
4 = I am quite confident that my expectation will be correct 
5 = I am very confident that my expectation will be correct 
6 = I am absolutely confident that my expectation will be correct 
 
When you finished entering the numbers into the respective cells, press the OK-button. 
Once you have pressed the button, you can no longer revise your decision for this period. 
 
Figure B1: Input screen 
 
 
 
As soon as all firms have chosen their prices, the outcomes of this period will be shown in 
the outcome-screen. 
The upper part of this screen shows the outcomes of the current period. This screen shows 
your decision in the current period, the average price, your real income in this period, and your 
total real payoff. 
The lower part of this screen displays the outcomes of past periods. 
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Figure B2: Outcome screen 
  
 
 
Overview: What you have to do in each period. 
In each period, each firm has to choose a price. Every integer price from 1 to 30 can be chosen (1 ≤  
selling price ≤  30). 
• Enter your price decision into the first cell of the input screen.  
• Enter the average price you expect to prevail in this period into the second cell  
(1 ≤  selling price ≤  30) 
• Enter your confidence in your price expectation into the third cell (numbers 1 to 6).  
 
When you have completed the three cells, press the OK-Button. The remaining time to take 
your decisions is shown in the upper right corner of the screen. 
When all participants have taken their decisions, or when the time has elapsed, all 
participants are shown the outcome screen. This screen shows your decisions, actual average 
prices and your real payoff in points for the current and the past periods. 
 
To take your decisions the following aids are at your disposition: 
Green income table: Helps you to estimate your expected nominal point income (You are a 
firm of type y). Your payoff is determined by your real income in points.  
You can calculate your real income from the nominal income (= numbers shown in the 
income table) by applying the following formula:  
Real income =  Nominal income / Average price of other firms 
Blue income table: Helps to estimate the nominal point income of the firms of type x in your 
group. The payoff of these firms are also determined by their real point income. To calculate the 
real income of firms of type x, you also apply the formula above. 
Outcome screen: Displays your selling price, the actual average price and your real income 
for the present and the past periods.  
Do you have any questions? 
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Control questions 
You have to answer all of the following questions. If you do not answer a question, you will 
be excluded from the experiment and all payments. Wrong answers do not have any 
consequences. If you have any questions, please ask us. 
 
1. Please indicate an expectation for the average price of other firms from 1 to 30. 
 Expected average price   ............................ 
 
2. Please indicate a selling price from 1 to 30. 
 Selling price   ............................ 
 
3. What is your expected nominal income in points at the prices you indicated in 1)  
 and 2)? 
 Your nominal income   ............................ 
 
4. What is your expected real income at the prices you indicated in 1) and 2)? 
 Your real income   ............................ 
 
5. Suppose you choose a price of 1. The other firm of type y chooses a price of 30.  
 The first firm of type x chooses a price of 7 and the second firm of type x chooses a price of 
23.  
a) What is your average price at the (fictitious) prices?  ............................  
 What is your nominal income?  ............................ 
 What is your real income?  ............................ 
 
b) What is the average price of the other firm of type y? ............................ 
 What is the nominal income of this firm? ............................ 
 What is the real income of this firm? ............................ 
 
c) What is the average price of the first firm of type x? ............................ 
 What is the nominal income of this firm? ............................ 
 What is the real income of this firm? ............................ 
 
d) What is the average price of the second firm of type x? ............................ 
 What is the nominal income of this firm? ............................ 
 What is the real income of this firm? ............................ 
 
  
Real Payoff Table C1: Complements, post-shock, Type x 
Average price of other firms 
selling price 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 
1 39 39 20 9 5 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
2 20 20 39 20 9 5 3 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
3 9 9 20 39 20 9 5 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
4 5 5 9 20 39 20 9 5 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
5 3 3 5 9 20 39 20 9 5 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
6 2 3 3 5 9 20 39 20 9 5 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
7 2 2 2 3 5 9 20 39 20 9 5 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
8 2 2 2 3 3 5 9 20 39 20 9 5 5 5 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
9 2 2 2 2 2 3 5 9 20 39 20 9 9 9 5 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
10 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 5 9 20 39 20 20 20 9 5 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
11 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 3 5 9 20 39 39 39 20 9 5 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
12 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 5 9 20 20 20 39 20 9 5 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
13 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 3 5 9 9 9 20 39 20 9 5 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
14 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 5 5 5 9 20 39 20 9 5 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
15 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 5 9 20 39 20 9 5 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
16 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 3 5 9 20 39 20 9 5 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
17 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 5 9 20 39 20 9 5 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
18 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 5 9 20 39 20 9 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
19 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 5 9 20 39 20 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
20 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 5 9 20 39 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
21 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 5 9 20 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 
22 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 5 9 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
23 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 5 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
24 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
25 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
26 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
27 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
28 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
29 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
30 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
  
Real Payoff Table C2: Complements, post-shock, Type y 
Average price of other firms 
selling price 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 
1 5 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
2 9 5 3 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
3 20 9 5 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
4 39 20 9 5 3 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
5 20 39 20 9 5 3 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
6 9 20 39 20 9 5 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
7 5 9 20 39 20 9 5 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
8 3 5 9 20 39 20 9 5 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
9 2 3 5 9 20 39 20 9 5 3 2 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
10 2 3 3 5 9 20 39 20 9 5 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
11 2 2 2 3 5 9 20 39 20 9 5 5 5 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
12 2 2 2 3 3 5 9 20 39 20 9 9 9 5 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
13 1 2 2 2 2 3 5 9 20 39 20 20 20 9 5 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
14 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 5 9 20 39 39 39 20 9 5 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
15 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 3 5 9 20 20 20 39 20 9 5 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
16 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 5 9 9 9 20 39 20 9 5 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
17 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 3 5 5 5 9 20 39 20 9 5 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 
18 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 5 9 20 39 20 9 5 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 
19 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 2 3 5 9 20 39 20 9 5 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
20 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 5 9 20 39 20 9 5 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
21 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 5 9 20 39 20 9 5 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 
22 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 5 9 20 39 20 9 5 3 2 2 2 2 2 
23 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 3 5 9 20 39 20 9 5 3 3 3 3 3 
24 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 5 9 20 39 20 9 5 5 5 5 5 
25 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 5 9 20 39 20 9 9 9 9 9 
26 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 5 9 20 39 20 20 20 20 20 
27 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 5 9 20 39 39 39 39 39 
28 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 5 9 20 20 20 20 20 
29 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 5 9 9 9 9 9 
30 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 5 5 5 5 5 
  
Real Payoff Table C3: Substitutes, post-shock, Type x 
Average price of other firms 
selling price 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 5 9 20 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 
2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 5 9 20 39 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 5 9 20 39 20 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 5 9 20 39 20 9 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 5 9 20 39 20 9 5 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 3 5 9 20 39 20 9 5 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 5 9 20 39 20 9 5 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
8 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 5 5 5 9 20 39 20 9 5 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
9 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 3 5 9 9 9 20 39 20 9 5 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
10 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 5 9 20 20 20 39 20 9 5 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
11 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 3 5 9 20 39 39 39 20 9 5 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
12 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 5 9 20 39 20 20 20 9 5 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
13 2 2 2 2 2 3 5 9 20 39 20 9 9 9 5 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
14 2 2 2 3 3 5 9 20 39 20 9 5 5 5 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
15 2 2 2 3 5 9 20 39 20 9 5 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
16 2 3 3 5 9 20 39 20 9 5 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
17 3 3 5 9 20 39 20 9 5 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
18 5 5 9 20 39 20 9 5 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
19 9 9 20 39 20 9 5 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
20 20 20 39 20 9 5 3 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
21 39 39 20 9 5 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
22 20 20 9 5 3 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
23 9 9 5 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
24 5 5 3 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
25 3 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
26 2 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
27 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
28 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
29 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
30 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
  
Real Payoff Table C4: Substitutes, post-shock, Type y 
Average price of other firms 
selling price 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 5 9 20 39 39 39 39 39 
2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 5 9 20 39 20 20 20 20 20 
3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 5 9 20 39 20 9 9 9 9 9 
4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 5 9 20 39 20 9 5 5 5 5 5 
5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 3 5 9 20 39 20 9 5 3 3 3 3 3 
6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 5 9 20 39 20 9 5 3 2 2 2 2 2 
7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 5 9 20 39 20 9 5 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 
8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 5 9 20 39 20 9 5 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 2 3 5 9 20 39 20 9 5 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
10 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 5 9 20 39 20 9 5 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 
11 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 3 5 5 5 9 20 39 20 9 5 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 
12 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 5 9 9 9 20 39 20 9 5 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
13 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 3 5 9 20 20 20 39 20 9 5 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
14 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 5 9 20 39 39 39 20 9 5 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
15 1 2 2 2 2 3 5 9 20 39 20 20 20 9 5 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
16 2 2 2 3 3 5 9 20 39 20 9 9 9 5 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
17 2 2 2 3 5 9 20 39 20 9 5 5 5 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
18 2 3 3 5 9 20 39 20 9 5 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
19 2 3 5 9 20 39 20 9 5 3 2 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
20 3 5 9 20 39 20 9 5 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
21 5 9 20 39 20 9 5 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
22 9 20 39 20 9 5 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
23 20 39 20 9 5 3 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
24 39 20 9 5 3 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
25 20 9 5 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
26 9 5 3 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
27 5 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
28 3 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
29 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
30 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
  
Nominal Payoff Table D1: Complements, post-shock, Type x 
Average price of other firms 
selling price 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 
1 39 78 60 34 24 19 17 16 16 16 16 17 18 19 20 20 21 21 22 23 24 25 25 26 27 28 30 31 32 33 
2 20 40 117 80 43 29 23 20 18 18 17 18 19 20 21 21 21 22 23 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 
3 9 17 60 156 100 52 34 26 22 20 19 19 21 22 22 22 22 23 23 24 25 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 34 
4 5 10 26 80 195 120 60 38 29 25 22 21 23 25 24 23 23 24 24 24 25 26 26 27 28 29 31 32 33 34 
5 3 6 14 34 100 234 140 69 43 32 27 24 26 28 26 25 25 25 25 25 26 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 
6 2 5 10 19 43 120 273 160 77 48 36 30 32 34 30 28 27 26 26 26 27 27 27 28 29 30 32 33 34 35 
7 2 4 7 13 24 52 140 312 180 86 53 39 42 45 37 32 30 29 28 28 28 28 28 29 30 31 32 33 35 36 
8 2 4 6 10 16 29 60 160 351 200 95 58 62 67 49 39 34 32 30 29 29 29 29 29 31 32 33 34 35 37 
9 2 3 5 8 12 19 34 69 180 390 220 103 112 120 72 52 42 36 33 32 31 30 30 30 32 33 34 35 37 38 
10 1 3 5 7 10 15 23 38 77 200 429 240 260 280 129 77 55 44 39 35 33 32 32 31 33 34 35 37 38 39 
11 1 3 4 6 9 12 17 26 43 86 220 468 507 546 300 138 82 58 47 41 37 35 34 33 34 36 37 39 40 41 
12 1 3 4 6 8 11 14 20 29 48 95 240 260 280 585 320 146 86 61 49 43 39 36 35 37 38 40 41 42 44 
13 1 3 4 6 7 10 12 16 22 32 53 103 112 120 300 624 340 155 91 65 52 45 40 38 40 41 43 44 46 48 
14 1 2 4 5 7 9 11 14 18 25 36 58 62 67 129 320 663 360 163 96 68 54 47 42 44 46 48 49 51 53 
15 1 2 4 5 7 8 10 13 16 20 27 39 42 45 72 138 340 702 380 172 101 71 57 49 51 53 55 57 59 61 
16 1 2 4 5 6 8 10 12 14 18 22 30 32 34 49 77 146 360 741 400 181 106 74 59 62 64 66 69 71 74 
17 1 2 4 5 6 8 9 11 13 16 19 24 26 28 37 52 82 155 380 780 420 189 110 78 81 84 87 91 94 97 
18 1 2 3 5 6 7 9 10 12 15 17 21 23 25 30 39 55 86 163 400 819 440 198 115 120 125 130 134 139 144 
19 1 2 3 5 6 7 9 10 12 14 16 19 21 22 26 32 42 58 91 172 420 858 460 206 215 224 232 241 249 258 
20 1 2 3 5 6 7 8 10 11 13 15 18 19 20 24 28 34 44 61 96 181 440 897 480 500 520 540 560 580 600 
21 1 2 3 4 6 7 8 10 11 13 14 17 18 19 22 25 30 36 47 65 101 189 460 936 975 1014 1053 1092 1131 1170 
22 1 2 3 4 6 7 8 9 11 12 14 16 17 18 21 23 27 32 39 49 68 106 198 480 500 520 540 560 580 600 
23 1 2 3 4 6 7 8 9 11 12 13 15 16 18 20 22 25 29 33 41 52 71 110 206 215 224 232 241 249 258 
24 1 2 3 4 5 7 8 9 10 12 13 15 16 17 19 21 23 26 30 35 43 54 74 115 120 125 130 134 139 144 
25 1 2 3 4 5 7 8 9 10 11 13 14 16 17 18 20 22 25 28 32 37 45 57 78 81 84 87 91 94 97 
26 1 2 3 4 5 7 8 9 10 11 13 14 15 16 18 20 21 24 26 29 33 39 47 59 62 64 66 69 71 74 
27 1 2 3 4 5 6 8 9 10 11 12 14 15 16 18 19 21 23 25 28 31 35 40 49 51 53 55 57 59 61 
28 1 2 3 4 5 6 8 9 10 11 12 14 15 16 17 19 20 22 24 26 29 32 36 42 44 46 48 49 51 53 
29 1 2 3 4 5 6 8 9 10 11 12 13 15 16 17 18 20 21 23 25 28 30 34 38 40 41 43 44 46 48 
30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 17 18 20 21 23 24 27 29 32 35 37 38 40 41 42 44 
  
Nominal Payoff Table D2: Complements, post-shock, Type y 
Average price of other firms 
selling price 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 
1 5 6 7 8 9 10 10 11 12 13 13 15 16 17 18 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 27 29 30 31 32 
2 9 10 10 10 10 11 11 12 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 
3 20 17 14 13 12 12 12 13 13 14 14 16 17 18 18 19 20 21 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 
4 39 40 26 19 16 15 14 14 14 15 15 17 18 18 19 20 20 21 22 23 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 
5 20 78 60 34 24 19 17 16 16 16 16 18 19 19 20 20 21 21 22 23 24 25 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 
6 9 40 117 80 43 29 23 20 18 18 17 19 21 20 21 21 21 22 23 23 24 25 26 27 27 28 29 30 31 33 
7 5 17 60 156 100 52 34 26 22 20 19 21 23 22 22 22 22 23 23 24 25 25 26 27 28 28 30 31 32 33 
8 3 10 26 80 195 120 60 38 29 25 22 24 26 25 24 23 23 24 24 24 25 26 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 
9 2 6 14 34 100 234 140 69 43 32 27 30 32 28 26 25 25 25 25 25 26 26 27 28 28 29 30 31 32 34 
10 2 5 10 19 43 120 273 160 77 48 36 39 42 34 30 28 27 26 26 26 27 27 27 28 29 29 31 32 33 34 
11 2 4 7 13 24 52 140 312 180 86 53 58 62 45 37 32 30 29 28 28 28 28 28 29 29 30 31 32 33 34 
12 2 4 6 10 16 29 60 160 351 200 95 103 112 67 49 39 34 32 30 29 29 29 29 29 30 30 32 33 34 35 
13 1 3 5 8 12 19 34 69 180 390 220 240 260 120 72 52 42 36 33 32 31 30 30 30 31 31 32 33 35 36 
14 1 3 5 7 10 15 23 38 77 200 429 468 507 280 129 77 55 44 39 35 33 32 32 31 32 32 33 34 35 37 
15 1 3 4 6 9 12 17 26 43 86 220 240 260 546 300 138 82 58 47 41 37 35 34 33 33 33 34 35 37 38 
16 1 3 4 6 8 11 14 20 29 48 95 103 112 280 585 320 146 86 61 49 43 39 36 35 34 34 35 37 38 39 
17 1 3 4 6 7 10 12 16 22 32 53 58 62 120 300 624 340 155 91 65 52 45 40 38 37 36 37 39 40 41 
18 1 2 4 5 7 9 11 14 18 25 36 39 42 67 129 320 663 360 163 96 68 54 47 42 40 38 40 41 42 44 
19 1 2 4 5 7 8 10 13 16 20 27 30 32 45 72 138 340 702 380 172 101 71 57 49 44 41 43 44 46 48 
20 1 2 4 5 6 8 10 12 14 18 22 24 26 34 49 77 146 360 741 400 181 106 74 59 51 46 48 49 51 53 
21 1 2 4 5 6 8 9 11 13 16 19 21 23 28 37 52 82 155 380 780 420 189 110 78 62 53 55 57 59 61 
22 1 2 3 5 6 7 9 10 12 15 17 19 21 25 30 39 55 86 163 400 819 440 198 115 81 64 66 69 71 74 
23 1 2 3 5 6 7 9 10 12 14 16 18 19 22 26 32 42 58 91 172 420 858 460 206 120 84 87 91 94 97 
24 1 2 3 5 6 7 8 10 11 13 15 17 18 20 24 28 34 44 61 96 181 440 897 480 215 125 130 134 139 144 
25 1 2 3 4 6 7 8 10 11 13 14 16 17 19 22 25 30 36 47 65 101 189 460 936 500 224 232 241 249 258 
26 1 2 3 4 6 7 8 9 11 12 14 15 16 18 21 23 27 32 39 49 68 106 198 480 975 520 540 560 580 600 
27 1 2 3 4 6 7 8 9 11 12 13 15 16 18 20 22 25 29 33 41 52 71 110 206 500 1014 1053 1092 1131 1170 
28 1 2 3 4 5 7 8 9 10 12 13 14 16 17 19 21 23 26 30 35 43 54 74 115 215 520 540 560 580 600 
29 1 2 3 4 5 7 8 9 10 11 13 14 15 17 18 20 22 25 28 32 37 45 57 78 120 224 232 241 249 258 
30 1 2 3 4 5 7 8 9 10 11 13 14 15 16 18 20 21 24 26 29 33 39 47 59 81 125 130 134 139 144 
  
Nominal Payoff Table D3: Substitutes, post-shock, Type x 
Average price of other firms 
selling price 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 
1 1 2 3 4 6 7 8 10 11 13 14 17 18 19 22 25 30 36 47 65 101 189 460 936 975 1014 1053 1092 1131 1170 
2 1 2 3 5 6 7 8 10 11 13 15 18 19 20 24 28 34 44 61 96 181 440 897 480 500 520 540 560 580 600 
3 1 2 3 5 6 7 9 10 12 14 16 19 21 22 26 32 42 58 91 172 420 858 460 206 215 224 232 241 249 258 
4 1 2 3 5 6 7 9 10 12 15 17 21 23 25 30 39 55 86 163 400 819 440 198 115 120 125 130 134 139 144 
5 1 2 4 5 6 8 9 11 13 16 19 24 26 28 37 52 82 155 380 780 420 189 110 78 81 84 87 91 94 97 
6 1 2 4 5 6 8 10 12 14 18 22 30 32 34 49 77 146 360 741 400 181 106 74 59 62 64 66 69 71 74 
7 1 2 4 5 7 8 10 13 16 20 27 39 42 45 72 138 340 702 380 172 101 71 57 49 51 53 55 57 59 61 
8 1 2 4 5 7 9 11 14 18 25 36 58 62 67 129 320 663 360 163 96 68 54 47 42 44 46 48 49 51 53 
9 1 3 4 6 7 10 12 16 22 32 53 103 112 120 300 624 340 155 91 65 52 45 40 38 40 41 43 44 46 48 
10 1 3 4 6 8 11 14 20 29 48 95 240 260 280 585 320 146 86 61 49 43 39 36 35 37 38 40 41 42 44 
11 1 3 4 6 9 12 17 26 43 86 220 468 507 546 300 138 82 58 47 41 37 35 34 33 34 36 37 39 40 41 
12 1 3 5 7 10 15 23 38 77 200 429 240 260 280 129 77 55 44 39 35 33 32 32 31 33 34 35 37 38 39 
13 2 3 5 8 12 19 34 69 180 390 220 103 112 120 72 52 42 36 33 32 31 30 30 30 32 33 34 35 37 38 
14 2 4 6 10 16 29 60 160 351 200 95 58 62 67 49 39 34 32 30 29 29 29 29 29 31 32 33 34 35 37 
15 2 4 7 13 24 52 140 312 180 86 53 39 42 45 37 32 30 29 28 28 28 28 28 29 30 31 32 33 35 36 
16 2 5 10 19 43 120 273 160 77 48 36 30 32 34 30 28 27 26 26 26 27 27 27 28 29 30 32 33 34 35 
17 3 6 14 34 100 234 140 69 43 32 27 24 26 28 26 25 25 25 25 25 26 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 
18 5 10 26 80 195 120 60 38 29 25 22 21 23 25 24 23 23 24 24 24 25 26 26 27 28 29 31 32 33 34 
19 9 17 60 156 100 52 34 26 22 20 19 19 21 22 22 22 22 23 23 24 25 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 34 
20 20 40 117 80 43 29 23 20 18 18 17 18 19 20 21 21 21 22 23 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 
21 39 78 60 34 24 19 17 16 16 16 16 17 18 19 20 20 21 21 22 23 24 25 25 26 27 28 30 31 32 33 
22 20 40 26 19 16 15 14 14 14 15 15 16 17 18 19 20 20 21 22 23 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 33 
23 9 17 14 13 12 12 12 13 13 14 14 15 16 18 18 19 20 21 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 
24 5 10 10 10 10 11 11 12 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 
25 3 6 7 8 9 10 10 11 12 13 13 14 16 17 18 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 
26 2 5 6 7 8 9 10 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 25 27 28 29 30 31 32 
27 2 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 23 24 25 26 27 29 30 31 32 
28 2 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 31 32 
29 2 3 4 6 7 8 9 10 11 11 12 13 15 16 17 18 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 
30 1 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 
  
Nominal Payoff Table D4: Substitutes, post-shock, Type y 
Average price of other firms 
selling price 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 
1 1 2 3 4 6 7 8 9 11 12 13 15 16 18 20 22 25 29 33 41 52 71 110 206 500 1014 1053 1092 1131 1170 
2 1 2 3 4 6 7 8 9 11 12 14 15 16 18 21 23 27 32 39 49 68 106 198 480 975 520 540 560 580 600 
3 1 2 3 4 6 7 8 10 11 13 14 16 17 19 22 25 30 36 47 65 101 189 460 936 500 224 232 241 249 258 
4 1 2 3 5 6 7 8 10 11 13 15 17 18 20 24 28 34 44 61 96 181 440 897 480 215 125 130 134 139 144 
5 1 2 3 5 6 7 9 10 12 14 16 18 19 22 26 32 42 58 91 172 420 858 460 206 120 84 87 91 94 97 
6 1 2 3 5 6 7 9 10 12 15 17 19 21 25 30 39 55 86 163 400 819 440 198 115 81 64 66 69 71 74 
7 1 2 4 5 6 8 9 11 13 16 19 21 23 28 37 52 82 155 380 780 420 189 110 78 62 53 55 57 59 61 
8 1 2 4 5 6 8 10 12 14 18 22 24 26 34 49 77 146 360 741 400 181 106 74 59 51 46 48 49 51 53 
9 1 2 4 5 7 8 10 13 16 20 27 30 32 45 72 138 340 702 380 172 101 71 57 49 44 41 43 44 46 48 
10 1 2 4 5 7 9 11 14 18 25 36 39 42 67 129 320 663 360 163 96 68 54 47 42 40 38 40 41 42 44 
11 1 3 4 6 7 10 12 16 22 32 53 58 62 120 300 624 340 155 91 65 52 45 40 38 37 36 37 39 40 41 
12 1 3 4 6 8 11 14 20 29 48 95 103 112 280 585 320 146 86 61 49 43 39 36 35 34 34 35 37 38 39 
13 1 3 4 6 9 12 17 26 43 86 220 240 260 546 300 138 82 58 47 41 37 35 34 33 33 33 34 35 37 38 
14 1 3 5 7 10 15 23 38 77 200 429 468 507 280 129 77 55 44 39 35 33 32 32 31 32 32 33 34 35 37 
15 1 3 5 8 12 19 34 69 180 390 220 240 260 120 72 52 42 36 33 32 31 30 30 30 31 31 32 33 35 36 
16 2 4 6 10 16 29 60 160 351 200 95 103 112 67 49 39 34 32 30 29 29 29 29 29 30 30 32 33 34 35 
17 2 4 7 13 24 52 140 312 180 86 53 58 62 45 37 32 30 29 28 28 28 28 28 29 29 30 31 32 33 34 
18 2 5 10 19 43 120 273 160 77 48 36 39 42 34 30 28 27 26 26 26 27 27 27 28 29 29 31 32 33 34 
19 2 6 14 34 100 234 140 69 43 32 27 30 32 28 26 25 25 25 25 25 26 26 27 28 28 29 30 31 32 34 
20 3 10 26 80 195 120 60 38 29 25 22 24 26 25 24 23 23 24 24 24 25 26 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 
21 5 17 60 156 100 52 34 26 22 20 19 21 23 22 22 22 22 23 23 24 25 25 26 27 28 28 30 31 32 33 
22 9 40 117 80 43 29 23 20 18 18 17 19 21 20 21 21 21 22 23 23 24 25 26 27 27 28 29 30 31 33 
23 20 78 60 34 24 19 17 16 16 16 16 18 19 19 20 20 21 21 22 23 24 25 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 
24 39 40 26 19 16 15 14 14 14 15 15 17 18 18 19 20 20 21 22 23 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 
25 20 17 14 13 12 12 12 13 13 14 14 16 17 18 18 19 20 21 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 
26 9 10 10 10 10 11 11 12 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 
27 5 6 7 8 9 10 10 11 12 13 13 15 16 17 18 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 27 29 30 31 32 
28 3 5 6 7 8 9 10 10 11 12 13 14 16 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 25 26 27 28 29 31 32 
29 2 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 
30 2 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 
  
Table 1: Overview of Parameters  
 Strategic Complements Strategic Substitutes 
Group size n = 4 n = 4 
Information feedback in period t P i vi− ,  P i vi− ,  
Representation of payoffs nominal  ( )P ivi−  nominal  ( )P ivi−  
Real equilibrium payoff 39 39 
A
ll 
pe
ri
od
s 
Choice variables Pi
= { ,2, ... ,30)1   P
i
= { ,2, ... ,30)1  
Money supply M0 42 42 
Average equilibrium price P * and 
average equilibrium expectation 
for the whole group 
25 25 
Equilibrium price for type x 22 22 
Equilibrium expectation for type x 26 26 
Equilibrium price for type y 28 28 
Pr
e-
sh
oc
k 
pe
ri
od
s 
Equilibrium expectation for type y 24 24 
Money supply M1 = M0/2 21 21 
Average equilibrium price P * and 
average equilibrium expectation 
for the whole group 
12.5 12.5 
Equilibrium price for type x 11 11 
Equilibrium expectation for type x 13 13 
Equilibrium price for type y 14 14 
Equilibrium expectation for type y 12 12 
Number of dominated strategies 
for type x 
9 9 
Number of dominated strategies 
for type y 
6 6 
Po
st
-s
ho
ck
 p
er
io
ds
 
Slope of reaction function + 1 or 0 - 1 or 0 
  
Table 2:  Deviation of Prices from Post-Shock Equilibrium 
 
 
 Strategic Complements 
treatment 
(CT) 
Strategic Substitutes 
treatment 
(ST) 
Post-shock period Coefficient αt Coefficient βt 
1 6.600*** - 1.167 
2 5.175*** 0.194 
3 4.275*** - 0.028 
4 3.425*** 0.000 
5 2.950*** - 0.139 
6 2.375*** - 0.111 
7 1.625** - 0.167 
8 1.475** 0.056 
9 1.000 0.000 
10 0.800 0.083 
11 0.275 0.000 
12 - 0.050 0.000 
13 0.000 0.000 
14 - 0.025 0.000 
15 - 0.528 
 
Notes: ∑∑
==
−+=−
15
1
14
1
*
1 )1(
t
tt
t
ttjt ddPP βα  
dt = 1 if price observation in period t is from CT 
 
*** significant at p = 0.001,  
** significant at p = 0.01,  
* significant at p = 0.05. 
 
 
  
 
 
Table 3: Percentages of Nominal Price Choices above, in and below Equilibrium 
(Subjects as Units of Observation) 
 Strategic complements Strategic substitutes 
Period Above 
equilibrium 
in 
equilibrium 
Below 
equilibrium 
above 
equilibrium 
in 
equilibrium 
below 
equilibrium 
13 - 15 3 93 5 1 96 3 
16 75 23 3 14 67 19 
17 75 23 3 19 67 14 
18 68 28 5 3 92 6 
19 - 21 48 51 1 1 97 2 
22 - 24 34 65 1 3 96 1 
25 - 27 18 77 6 3 96 1 
28 - 30 2 94 4 1 99 0 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Table 4:  Deviation of Expectations from Post-Shock Equilibrium 
 
 Strategic Complements 
treatment 
(CT) 
Strategic Substitutes 
treatment 
(ST) 
Post-shock period Coefficient αt Coefficient βt 
1 8.025*** 0.917 
2 6.325*** - 0.083 
3 4.950*** 0.056 
4 3.800*** 0.000 
5 3.100*** 0.000 
6 2.825*** - 0.083 
7 2.000** - 0.139 
8 1.525* - 0.111 
9 1.225 0.028 
10 0.625 0.028 
11 0.400 0.000 
12 - 0.050 0.000 
13 - 0.050 0.028 
14 - 0.050 - 0.028 
15 - 0.028 
 
Notes: ∑∑
==
−+=−
15
1
14
1
*
1 )1(
t
tt
t
ttjt ddEE βα  
where jtE  is group j’s average expectation of others’ average price in period t, and 
*
1E  is the 
average equilibrium expectation. dt = 1 if a price observation in period t is from the CT. 
 
*** significant at p = 0.001,  
** significant at p = 0.01,  
* significant at p = 0.05. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 1: Nominal Average Prices over Time 
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Figure 2a: Distribution of Individual Price Choices in Period 16 (x-types) 
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Figure 2b: Distribution of Individual Price Choices in Period 16 (y-types) 
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Figure 3a: Actual Average Prices and Average Best Reply for given Expectations 
Complements Treatment (Periods 16-18) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3b: Actual Average Prices and Average Best Reply for given Expectations 
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Figure 4: Average Price Expectations over Time 
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Figure 5: Efficiency Losses during the Post-shock Phase 
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Figure 6a: Simulations of Price Adjustment with Varying Numbers of Adaptive Players 
in the Substitutes Treatment (ST) 
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Figure 6b: Simulations of Price Adjustment with Varying Numbers of Adaptive Players 
in the Complements Treatment (CT) 
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Figure 7a: Distribution of Individual Price Expectations in Period 16 (x-types) 
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Figure 7b: Distribution of Individual Price Expectations in Period 16 (y-types) 
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